The political acceptability of climate policies is undermined by job-killing arguments, especially for the least-skilled workers. However, evidence for distributional impacts for different workers remains scant. We examine the associations between climate policies, proxied by energy prices and a stringency index, and workforce skills for 14 European countries and 15 industrial sectors over the period of 1995-2011. We find that, while the long-term decline in employment in most carbon-intensive sectors is unrelated to policy stringency, climate policies have been skill biased against manual workers and have favoured technicians and professionals. This skill bias is confirmed using a shift-share instrumental variable estimator.
Introduction
Concerns about international competitiveness and job losses have often characterized the political debate over climate policies. The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement is only the latest episode of a political discourse that, especially among the conservative parties, has exploited the job-killing argument to block the approval of ambitious climate policies (Coglianese et al., 2013) . Cragg et al. (2013) showed that US Congressional representatives are less inclined to vote for climate policies if they were elected from areas that are both poorer and have a pollution-intensive industrial structure. While the job-killing argument is less popular in the European debate, generous exemptions have been adopted in all countries to shelter polluting industries from international competition (Ekins and Speck, 1999) . According to Martin et al. (2014) , policymakers have overstated the relocation risk brought about by the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), which is the flagship EU policy on climate change mitigation. Empirical evidence has not disconfirmed these concerns: in most cases, air quality regulations and energy prices (a proxy for carbon tax) have modest negative employment effects, concentrated on polluting and energy-intensive industries (e.g., Greenstone climate policies and the greening of our economies induce changes in skill demand, and the extent to which these changes are aligned with those of on-going technological transformations are empirical issues that our paper seeks to answer.
The first step of our research is to provide an exploratory look at the way in which the adoption of climate policies interacts with other labour market trends in shaping longClimate Policies and Skill-Biased Employment Dynamics:
Evidence from EU countries* by compliance costs, the labour intensity of abatement technologies and the degree of competition in product markets. To illustrate, if the decrease in labour demand associated with a reduction in the scale of production of polluting sectors is greater than the increase in labour demand required in abatement technologies, the aggregate effect is negative.
Morgenstern et al. (2002) showed that the scale effect is small since firms have market power in polluting industries, and consequently, the increase in compliance costs can be passed on to consumers with negligible effects on total demand. For the sake of simplicity, the Porter hypothesis can be nested within this framework by allowing for innovation in abatement technologies, including both end-of-pipe and cleaner technologies (Frondel et al., 2007; Horbach et al., 2012) , to spur a green comparative advantage, possibly leading to net job creation. 1 Overall, the aggregate effect of environmental policies on labour demand remains a largely unresolved empirical issue.
On the one hand, the literature isolating the effects on most cost-exposed polluting industries has generally found negative employment effects. On the other hand, the literature focusing on employment, environmental policies and green innovation has generally found a positive correlation. 2 The main difficulty in reconciling the empirical findings of the two literature streams is that it is easier to derive a reduced-form specification, identify a reliable control group and thus obtain the causal effects in the first strand of literature than in the second. 3 Moreover, job destruction in polluting sectors can be offset by job creation in upstream suppliers of green technologies and services, which are difficult to assess in reduced-form econometric models. Finally, the timing of the effect is important because the offsetting mechanisms through innovation are likely to be effective in the medium to long term, while the increase in compliance costs occurs immediately (e.g., Lanoie et al. 2008) These research strands have so far focused on the aggregate employment impacts, while the impact of structural transformations can be highly skill biased. Looking at skill-biased impacts has been crucial to understanding the inequality-enhancing effects of globalization, ICTs and other policy reforms, especially market liberalization (Autor and Acemoglu, 2011; Goss et al., 2014) . In developed countries, all of these transformations have: i) been mildly labour-saving, especially in manufacturing; ii) reduced the demand for unskilled labour and routine jobs; and iii) increased the demand for highly skilled labour and abstract jobs, especially for non-routine interactive skills, compared to non- 1 Obviously, the theoretical mechanisms that support the Porter hypothesis are more sophisticated than this simple linkage effect. A good survey of the literature appears in Ambec et al. (2013) . 2 Reviewing the findings of these two strands of literature is beyond the scope of these papers, and the picture provided here is to a certain extent a drastic simplification due to space limitations. Examples of the first set of "negative" results are: Greenstone (2002) . 3 Estimating the impacts of environmental policies on innovation and then that of innovation on employment is not an easy task, given the presence of pervasive endogeneity issues in estimating both equations and the difficulties in finding reliable exclusion restrictions for identification purposes. 6 routine cognitive skills. 4 The theoretical rationale to account for these patterns is the socalled Routine-Replacing Technical Change hypothesis, according to which ICT technologies replace routine cognitive tasks in the workplace and facilitate the fragmentation of global value chains and the relocation of manual tasks in developing countries. At the same time, the combined effects of ICT technologies and increased international competition have disproportionately benefited talented workers through a combination of complementarity effects, the scalability of intangible investments and increased market size.
By analogy with these first-order structural changes, a key and yet unexplored question is whether the labour market impacts of environmental policies are biased towards certain workers' groups and whether the direction of the bias is similar to that of these changes.
Answering these questions not only is crucial for examining the labour market distributional impacts of climate policies, but it is also important for the acceptability and the design of environmental policies. Indeed, identifying the losers and supporting them during the transition to a new job will significantly increase the political acceptability of climate policies. Further, training workers with the skills required by green jobs would reduce the costs of coping with climate policies.
A chief difficulty is that we do not have clear theoretical insights, but only conjectures, into the relationship between climate policies (as a proxy of the demand of greener productions) and skill demand. Consequently, our paper aims at identifying data-driven patterns, which could provide basic insights and calibrations for theoretical contributions regarding the skill-biased effects of climate policies. An example is the paper by Hafstead and Williams III (2018), which, using a search and matching general equilibrium model,
showed that an aggregate, modest effect of a carbon tax masks a substantial relocation of labour between clean and dirty sectors. Because relocation costs are typically proportional to skill gaps (e.g., Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010) , an extension of this model could take advantage of our findings to express relocation costs as a function of such skill gaps. 5 4 In the seminal paper by Autor, Levy and Murnarne (2003), a key distinction within the high-skill group is that between non-routine cognitive skills, e.g., math, engineering and science, and non-routine interactive skills, e.g. language and social skills. 5 Empirically, relocation costs associated with environmental policies are difficult to estimate due to data limitations. An exception is the paper by Walker (2013), who estimated the long-term earning losses of approximately 20% for workers displaced by the Clean Air Act, the main command-and-control environmental policy in the US. His main finding is that these losses are very heterogeneous, being particularly large for older workers, women and those forced to change sectors. In contrast with these
To the best of our knowledge, research on the skill biasedness of environmental policies is still scant and mostly limited to the US. Indirect evidence has been provided in three 2 Data, measures and descriptive statistics
Data and measures
We use standard data sources that, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to combine in a unique dataset. Our final dataset includes 15 sectors: 13 manufacturing sectors, "mining and quarrying", and "electricity, gas and water supply", classified according to the NACE rev. 1.1 classification. 6 Due to missing data on key variables described below, we focus on 14 countries only. 7 The resulting dataset is a balanced panel for 15 industrial sectors and 14 countries.
findings, Curtis (2018) showed that the negative employment effects of the NOx Budget Trading Program are concentrated among younger cohorts. 6 We excluded 'construction' (NACE F), which is very different from other sectors in two important dimensions. First, it is an outlier in terms of employment. Second, it is sheltered by other shocks, such as international competition and automation. 7 The countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Over the period of 1995-2011,
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Our primary measure of sectoral exposure to climate policies is emissions intensity. The data source is the World Input Output Dataset (WIOD), which allows us to compute both the direct GHG emissions until 2009 (CO2, N2O and CH4 aggregated according to their global warming potential) of the sector and the indirect GHG emissions through the purchase of electricity from the power sector (using input-output technical coefficients).
To account for the direct and indirect exposures, our measure of GHG is the sum of the direct and indirect emissions (from the power sector) per unit of the sectoral value added. Table 1 summarizes the main data sources and the acronyms of the variables that are used throughout the paper, and it presents basic descriptive statistics for our variables of interest.
Descriptive evidence
[ Table 1 about here]
As a first glance towards understanding the associations between climate policies and labour market outcomes, we correlate both the levels ( Table 2 ) and long-term changes ( [ Table 2 and Table 3 
A taxonomy of exposure to multiple structural transformations
Isolating the associations between climate policies and workforce composition is challenging due to the contemporaneous presence of other structural drivers that have well-known biased effects on labour demand. Climate policies can either reinforce or mitigate the skill-biased effect of these changes. To consider in a compact way the overlapping of different shocks, we develop a taxonomy of sectors based on their degree 12 of exposure to structural drivers affecting labour market outcomes. Cluster analysis is the most natural method for allowing the data reveal this taxonomy, if any. 13 
Cluster analysis: methodology
The variables used to build the clusters are the following: i) the capital deepening and the technological level of the sector are captured using both non-ICT and ICT capital stocks per hour worked; ii) exposure to international competition is captured by import penetration; and iii) GHG intensity and the stock of EPO climate-related patents per hours worked are, respectively, our primary and secondary proxies for exposure to climate policies.
14 Note that the distribution of clustering variables is skewed and characterized by the presence of outliers. Therefore, as a preliminary step in the search for a meaningful sectoral taxonomy, we transform each variable in percentile ranks to avoid the formation of clusters driven by extreme values.
We cluster our country-sector pairs for each of the four years for which all data are together observations that are homogeneous within the cluster. We adopt a two-step procedure to identify the optimal composition of clusters, as suggested in Hair et al.
(2009). As a first step, we perform hierarchical clustering to identify the 'optimal' number of clusters (Milligan and Cooper, 1985) by assessing how distinct the clusters are (see Appendix A). As a second step, we use the resulting clusters (and corresponding centroids) as a starting point for the optimal re-attribution of observations into clusters by means of non-hierarchical clustering. 15 Our favourite clustering algorithm is the average linkage algorithm, which computes the distance (squared Euclidean distance) in clustering variables across all possible pairs of individuals across different clusters and aims at minimizing distances within the clusters and, at the same time, maximizing 13 For a similar use of cluster analysis to build a taxonomy based on skill diversity, see Consoli and Rentocchini (2016) . 14 Other variables could have been included as clustering variables, such as the total patent stock and investments in intangible capital, but at the cost of increasing complexity and losing observations. 15 Hierarchical clustering techniques sequentially split clusters and do not allow for the re-allocation of observations across different branches of the clustering tree. Non-hierarchical clustering techniques are more flexible and allow for re-allocation of observations to render clusters more homogeneous and distinct.
13 distances across clusters. This procedure provides six main clusters, which are described in the following sub-sections (see Appendix A for details). Table 4 provides the description of the cluster taxonomy by reporting the average percentiles (and the median values in parentheses) of clustering variables across the six different clusters. These figures are the basis for understanding the typical features of observations belonging to different clusters and attributing a label to each cluster.
Profiling of clusters
[ Table 4 about here]
To evaluate the differences in clustering variables across clusters, we run five linear regressions with a clustering variable as a dependent variable and all of the cluster dummies as independent variables. Not surprisingly, given that the cluster analysis seeks to maximize the differences in clustering variables across clusters, cluster dummies are jointly (F-test) significantly different from zero for all of the clustering variables, and they explain a significant proportion of the whole variance (R squared far greater than 0.6). In the last row of the table, we also enlist pairs of clusters for which clustering variables are not significantly different (based on Scheffe's test). Note that this outcome is more frequent for ICT capital (6 of 15 possible pairwise comparisons) than for the other four clustering variables, especially the climate-related ones, corroborating the well-known fact that ICT is a general-purpose technology with a broad range of applications (Helpman, 1998).
We now discuss the features of the six clusters by combining information about the clustering variables (Table 4 ) with the dynamics of the clustering variables across different clusters ( Figure 1 ). Theoretically, we should expect that being exposed to multiple shocks is worse than being exposed to a single shock because all structural transformations (except perhaps green innovations) are potentially labour saving.
[ Figure 1 about here] cluster is the fourth largest.
The third cluster (Green Global High-tech) resembles the second with two notable differences: i) a significantly larger share of green knowledge; and ii) a very modest GHG emissions intensity. This cluster contains the Machinery and Equipment producers, as well as some Textile, Rubber and Plastics producers (Table A2) , and it is the second in terms of size with an average of 20.6% in total employment. Notably, the cluster becomes significantly greener over time, in terms of both green patents and emissions intensity.
Cluster 4 (Exposed to Automation) is also a large cluster with 19.5% of total employment on average. It collects observations that remain relatively, but not fully, sheltered by international competition and climate-related transformations. For this reason, we use it as a benchmark category in our regression analysis. For all of the clustering variables, the observed growth rates for this cluster resemble those experienced by other clusters.
The last two clusters (Black and Exposed to Multiple Shocks and Black High-tech) are the most polluting ones, but they represent, on average, a remarkably smaller share of hours worked (7.2% and 6.7%, respectively). Both cluster 5 and cluster 6 score high along all of the dimensions, especially climate-related ones; the only notable difference is that cluster 6 has been fully sheltered by international competition. Both clusters are very concentrated sector-wise: Chemicals and Mining for cluster 5; and Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear and Electricity Generation for cluster 6. Concerning the trends over time, cluster 6 is by and large the best performer in terms of increases in green patent intensity, while cluster 5 is an outlier in terms of increased trade exposure.
The taxonomy at work
Before moving to our econometric analysis, in which use cluster dummies to flexibly control for exposure to structural shocks, we assess here the composition and dynamics of different clusters in terms of workforce skills. In Table 5 , we observe that the composition of the labour force is different across clusters, and the differences go in the expected directions, following a general technology-skill complementarity argument.
However, as evident in last three rows of the table, cluster dummies explain only a small proportion of the variance in our measures of skills, except for manual workers, and the pairwise differences across clusters are often not statistically significant, especially for managers.
[ Table 5 and Figure 2 about here] Figure 2 reports the trends in our skill measures across different clusters. According to the previous discussion, cluster 5 and, to a lesser extent, cluster 1 should be those at a higher risk of job loss since they are affected by a larger number of labour-saving shocks.
We observe that hours worked declined mostly in clusters exposed to multiple shocks and international competition (1, 3, 5) , although it is cluster 6 that experienced the largest employment decline. Visually, a pronounced skill upgrading is widespread, but we do not observe any striking pattern clearly related to climate-related factors, except for the switch from manual workers to technicians in cluster 6.
[ Table 6 about here]
That the clusters do not reveal pronounced differences in employment patterns is also confirmed in Table 6 , in which we regress the 4-year long-term changes (1995-1999, 1999-2003, 2003-2007, 2007-2011) in employment on initial cluster dummies (columns 1-2) and then on clustering variables (columns 3-4). Indeed, only cluster 1 experienced a significant decrease in employment, compared to other clusters. Importantly, the explanatory power of the initial cluster dummies alone (column 1) is greater than that of time-varying lagged clustering dummies (column 3), justifying the use of cluster dummies to consider in a flexible way the exposure to multiple shocks. Finally, the signs of the two proxies for exposure to climate policies are in line with those expected from our discussion in section 1.1: negative and significant for GHG intensity and positive and significant for green patent intensity.
We can conclude that cluster analysis provides a flexible method to control for exposure to multiple shocks, but a fully-fledged assessment of the associations of climate policies and skill-biased employment dynamics should directly include our two proxies for exposure to these policies. The next describes the methodology used to estimate such an association and the main results of the paper.
4 Link between climate policies and labour market outcomes
Empirical strategy
In this section, we study the associations between climate policies and labour market outcomes through standard econometrics tools. Our starting point is the following equation, weighted for the initial employment level of the country-sector cell to account for differences in size:
where: i) Our dependent variable is the 4-year change in share of labour of type k, i.e.,
∆ . There are two advantages to using a long difference estimator. First, we directly estimate the permanent changes in workforce skills. Second, first differencing removes time-invariant the fixed characteristics of the countrysector pair and transforms into a stationary variable. 17 ii) The independent variables of interest are the three policies: the EU-ETS ( _ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ); energy prices ( _ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ); and an index of all of the other policies except for the EU-ETS ( _ _ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ).
iii)
1 { , }∈ , =95 are five cluster dummies (the omitted category being cluster 4 "Exposed to automation") that consider the initial exposure and overlapping of the various structural changes discussed above. Using the initial cluster avoids the problem of endogeneity related to cluster switching, which is however not as frequent as shown in Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A.
iv)
We include the initial level of GHG intensity in logs (log ( ) , =95 )to capture the differential performance of a country-sector pair within a given cluster, depending on the initial level of GHG emission.
v) is a full set of country-specific year dummies that account nonparametrically for a broad range of country-specific time trends (e.g., differential effect of the great recession, general level of technology and competencies), which are likely to be correlated with both ∆ and our variables of interest. Note that estimating the autonomous influence of _ _ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ is not possible when including country-by-time dummies. are sector dummies absorbing observable and unobservable sector-specific trends. We assume these trends to be linear because cluster dummies and nonparametric country trends are already intended to capture deviations from long-term sectoral patterns, such as globalization and automation.
vii) is a standard error term.
Before turning to the issue of policy endogeneity, we discuss the functional form used for the three policy variables. An important issue is whether to include the policies in differences or in levels. Compared to the policy changes, policy levels have a first-order effect on the cost structure and thus on industry competitiveness, labour demand and workforce skills. For instance, the effect on costs of a given change in energy prices depends on the initial levels of energy prices. To capture synthetically both the levels and the difference effect, we compute the average of the policy of interest between the initial and final years of the time interval used for the corresponding long-difference; e.g., _ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ is the average energy price between time t and time t-4.
Another important choice regards the interactions between the policy variables, on the one hand, and the index of emissions intensity discussed above, on the other. To avoid multicollinearity, we decide to include only the interaction between _ _ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ and the initial GHG emission intensity of the sector-country pair. Indeed, unlike energy prices and ETS stringency, the EPS index varies only at the country level, so it is not possible to identify its autonomous effect once we include non-parametric country trends. This choice is corroborated by an additional econometric exercise in which we estimate variants of equation 1 with only one policy at a time and its interaction with GHG intensity. The results, reported in Table B2 
19 Since the EU-ETS is a European policy, an ideal instrument for _ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ does not exist at the country-by-sector level because industrial groups directly lobby at the EU level to alter the effective stringency of the ETS.
The instrument of the interaction term log ( ) , =95 × ̅̅̅̅̅̅ is built as a combination of two variables. The average GHG of non-EU, high-income OECD countries (US, Japan, Canada, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia) in 1995 is the instrument for log ( ) , =95 , while we use the EPS in all EU countries except for i as an instrument for ̅̅̅̅̅̅ . The exclusion restriction is satisfied by construction since we switch off the timevarying idiosyncratic characteristics of each specific country-sector pair. At the sector level, the average GHG exposure in other countries should reflect deep technological factors, rather than idiosyncratic country characteristics. At the country and time levels, the policy variation in all of the other countries isolates the EU-driven, arguably more exogenous, component of national climate policies.
The instrument of energy prices exploits a classical shift-share logic (Bartik, 1991 Table 7 presents the OLS estimations of equation 1, while Table 8 contains the IV counterpart. In both tables, the results are presented for the changes in five dependent variables: the log of total hours worked and the shares of hours worked by managers, professionals, technicians and manual workers. Clearly, while the IV specification 20 provides a better estimation of the causal effects of climate policies, the OLS specification has a number of advantages worth mentioning. Above all, it allows for separately identifying the coefficient associated with the EU-ETS. Moreover, it is amenable to extensions to include the other variable that, as we discussed above, could shape the associations between climate policies and employment dynamics, that is, green patent intensity. Finally, it is of its own interest for evaluating the extent to which the OLS coefficients are biased.
Estimation results
[ Table 7 and Table 8 about here] Both Table 7 and Table 8 This pronounced skill bias in favour of technical, scientific and engineering skills (i.e., engineers are a substantial proportion of professionals) bears policy relevance given the increase in carbon prices planned by European countries, both at the national (i.e., carbon taxes) and EU levels (i.e., carbon price floors). Our results indicate that investing in technical and engineering skills can significantly reduce the socio-economic costs of a high carbon price scenario. On the one hand, expanding the supply of such skills will decrease the hourly wages of technical workers and thus production costs. On the other hand, retraining manual workers for middle-skill technical jobs for clean and energysaving tasks will provide fresh opportunities to workers who bear the bulk of the costs of all of the recent structural transformations in the labour market.
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An interesting result that deserves further examination is the mitigating effect of EPS on total employment in polluting industries. We examine how the combined effects of the initial GHG intensity (̂3log ( ) , =95 +̂4log ( ) , =95 × ̅̅̅̅̅̅ ) varies by replacing the averages values ̅̅̅̅̅̅ and log ( ) , =95 within each decile of initial GHG intensity.
We find that the monotonicity of the relationship is preserved: the fraction of the employment decrease explained by GHG intensity is nearly 0 at the first decile, while it is 11.7% at the median and 44.1% for the most polluting observations at the 9 th decile. To interpret this result, note that there is a modest but negative correlation (-0.11) between initial GHG intensity and EPS stringency, as well as a positive and significant correlation between the green patent stock per capita and EPS stringency (0.30). Taken together, this evidence suggests that green tech leaders might be more willing to adopt stringent climate policies that can mitigate the long-term employment decline in polluting industries.
We formally test this conjecture in estimating an augmented specification with a full set of interactions between EPS policy stringency (interacted with initial GHG intensity) and a "green tech" dummy variable equal to one for countries sufficiently close to the green technological frontier. 21 For the sake of parsimony, we include only the interaction of the green tech dummy with EPS and the initial GHG terms. Since it would be nearly impossible to find satisfactory instruments for all of the interactions, we estimate this equation with OLS.
[ Table 9 about here] Table 9 presents the results of this exercise. Examining the interaction terms between EPS and the green-tech dummy, the only statistically significant result corroborates our main findings, that is, the share of technicians increases more with climate policies in countries closer to the green technological frontier. Examining the interaction terms between GHG intensity and the green-tech dummy, we find no support for our hypothesis that green high-tech countries are able to mitigate the negative relationship between initial GHG intensity and total employment. This outcome is in contrast with the positive association between employment and the green patent stock per worker that we found in Table 6 .
This finding indicates that the inclusion of country-by-year and cluster dummies killed this positive and significant association. Further research is required to better understand whether this result is reliable or not, considering the problems in our measurement of green leadership, or whether it is a mismatch between green inventors and polluting industries. 22 Appendix B replicates Table 7 and Table 8 for different dependent variables: labour productivity (value added per hour worked or gross output per hour worked) and the shares of high-, medium-and low-skilled workers defined in terms of educational attainment as, respectively, university graduates, high-school graduates and lower secondary graduates or less (Tables B3 and B4 ). The main takeaways from these tables are that climate policies have no effect on labour productivity and that skill biases are less evident when using an education-based measurement of skills. While the second finding corroborates previous research in labour economics that suggests using task-and used Total Factor Productivity and a distance-to-the-frontier specification of productivity growth. We leave a more detailed examination of the effects of climate policies on labour productivity to future research.
Concluding remarks
Our paper investigates the effects of climate policies on the demand for workers with different skills. We find that the skill bias of climate policies mostly consists of a substitution of technical and professional workers for manual ones. While the main skillbias pattern is broadly consistent with that of other structural transformations, such as globalization and the ICT revolution, we observe for climate policies a more marked redirection toward technical and scientific skills (i.e., non-routine cognitive skills), Nevertheless, the mechanisms through which modest to large effects for the treated companies in polluting sectors translate into negligible effects at the sector-level are not clear. In our paper, we investigate the mediating effects of green technology, but we do not find conclusive evidence after controlling for sector and country effects.
This paper is a first step toward understanding of distributional labour market impacts of environmental policies. Although we find evidence of distributional impacts in terms of changes in demand for different groups of workers, the next step should be to examine earnings' effects. In this work, we refrain from examining the impact of climate policies on earnings for two reasons. First, estimating wage premiums for specific skill categories at the industry level introduces additional sources of bias related to compositional effects and self-selection regarding unobservable workers' characteristics. Second, institutional differences in wage-setting rules across EU countries should be considered, which would add another layer of complexity to our analysis. This analysis is left for future research using matched employer-employee data that are better suited for an analysis of earnings' dynamics (see Walker, 2013 Greenhouse gas emissions (CO2, CH4 and N2O expressed in CO2 equivalent tons) per real value added. The numerator also includes emissions embodied in the purchase of electricity (based on inputoutput estimates). Sector-country-year specific price of energy inputs. The price is the weighted average of country-year fuel specific energy prices, using country-sector-year specific energy mix as weight. 0.2484 0.3165 0.2298 (1995-1999; 1999-2003; 2003-2007; 2007-2011) weighted by hours worked in the first year of each time window. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (1995-1999; 1999-2003; 2003-2007; 2007-2011) weighted by hours worked in the first year of each time window. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include country-specific time dummies, sector dummies and initial (1995) cluster dummies. (1995-1999; 1999-2003; 2003-2007; 2007-2011) weighted by hours worked in the first year of each time window. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include country-specific time dummies, sector dummies and initial (1995) cluster dummies.
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Appendix A -Details on the cluster analysis Optimal number of clusters
The criteria to be used to select the ideal number of clusters are two: i) clusters should be distinct one from the other; and ii) individuals within the cluster should be similar. Even though there is no conclusive test to identify the optimal number of clusters, there are rules of the thumb based on the Pseudo T-squared statistics, the Je(2)/Je(1) statistics and the Chalinski-Harabasz pseudo F statistics (Table A1) . 
Stability of clusters over time
To evaluate the robustness of our 'pooled' clustering, we here evaluate the stability of clusters over time. In Table A3 we show the period-to-period transition matrix (weighted by beginning of period hours worked). Overall, 83.49% of observations (that account for 85.79% of hours worked) remain in the same cluster between two periods. In Table A4 we consider in detail the actual transitions across different clusters and report measures of workforce composition for observations with different transition patterns. Overall, we do not observe clear patterns in these dimensions for observations that change cluster. (1995-1999; 1999-2003; 2003-2007; 2007-2011) weighted by hours worked in the first year of each time window. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include country-specific time dummies, sector dummies and initial (1995) cluster dummies. (1995-1999; 1999-2003; 2003-2007; 2007-2011) weighted by hours worked in the first year of each time window. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include country-specific time dummies, sector dummies and initial (1995) cluster dummies. (1995-1999; 1999-2003; 2003-2007; 2007-2011) weighted by hours worked in the first year of each time window. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include country-specific time dummies, sector dummies and initial (1995) cluster dummies. F test of excluded IV: 33.35 
Appendix B -Additional information and results
